Report of General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate Armies of the Shenandoah and of the Potomac, regarding operations from May 22, 1861 to July 22, 1861. Includes a detailed report regarding 1st Bull Run. (with associated correspondence)
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Fairfax Court. House, October 14, 1861
The ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL, C. S.. Army.
SIR: I have the honor to submit to the honorable Secretary
of War a report of the operations of the troops under my command, which
terminated in the battle of Manassas.
I assumed command at Harper's Ferry on the 23d of May. The
force at that point then consisted of nine regiments and two battalions of
infantry, four companies of artillery, with sixteen pieces without caissons,
harness, or horses, and about three hundred cavalry. They were, of course,
undisciplined, several regiments without accouterments, and with an entirely
inadequate supply of ammunition.
I lost no time in making a complete reconnaissance of the place and its
environs, in which the chief engineer, Major (now Brigadier-General) Whiting,
ably assisted. The result confirmed my preconceived ideas. The position is
untenable by any force not strong enough to take the field against an invading
army and to hold both sides of the Potomac. It is a triangle, two sides being
formed by the Potomac and the Shenandoah, and the third by Furnace Ridge. The
plateau thus inclosed, and the end of Furnace Ridge itself, the only defensible
position, which, however, required for its adequate occupation double our
numbers, was exposed to enfilade and reverse fires of artillery from heights on
the Maryland side of the river. Within that line the ground-was more favorable
to an attacking than to a defending force. The Potomac can be easily crossed at
many points above and below, so that it is easily turned. It is twenty miles
from the great route into the valley of Virginia from Pennsylvania and Maryland,
by which General Patterson's approach was expected. Its garrison was thus out of
position to defend that valley or to prevent General McClellan's junction with
General Patterson. These were the obvious and important objects to be kept in
view. Besides being in position for them, it was necessary to be able on
emergency to join General Beauregard.
The occupation of Harper's Ferry by our Army perfectly suited
the enemy's views. We were bound to a fixed point; his movements were
unrestricted. These views were submitted to the military authorities. The
continued occupation of the place was, however, deemed by them indispensable. I
determined to hold it until the great objects of the Government required its
abandonment. The practicable roads from the West and Northwest, as well as from
Manassas, meet the route from Pennsylvania and Maryland at Winchester. That
point was, therefore, in my opinion, our best position. The distinguished
commander of the Army of the Potomac was convinced, like myself, of our
dependence upon each other, and promised to co-operate with me in case of need.
To guard against surprise and to impose upon the enemy, Major Whiting was
directed to mount a few heavy guns upon Furnace Ridge and otherwise strengthen
the position.
I was employed until the 13th of June in continuing what had
been begun by my predecessor, Colonel (now Major-General) Jackson--the
organization, instruction, and equipment of the troops, and providing means of
transportation and artillery horses. The river was observed from the Point of
Rocks to the western part of the county of Berkeley, the most distant portions
by the indefatigable Stuart with his cavalry. General Patterson's troops were
within a few hours of Williamsport, and General McClellan's in Western Virginia
were supposed to be approaching to effect a junction with Patterson, whose force
was reported by well-informed persons to be eighteen thousand men.
On the morning of the 13th of June information was received from Winchester that
Romney was occupied by two thousand Federal troops, supposed to be the vanguard
of McClellan's army. Col. A. P. Hill, with his own (Thirteenth) and Colonel
Gibbons' (Tenth) Virginia Regiments, was dispatched by railway to Winchester. He
was directed to move thence towards Romney, to take the best position and best
measures to check the advance of the enemy. He was to add to his command the
Third Tennessee Re, merit, which had just arrived at Winchester. During that day
and the next the heavy baggage and remaining public property were sent to
Winchester by the railway, and the bridges on the Potomac destroyed.
On the morning of the 15th the Army left Harper's Ferry for
Winchester--the force had been increased by three regiments since the 1st of
June---and bivouacked four miles beyond Charlestown.
On the morning of the 16th intelligence was received that
General Patterson's army had crossed the Potomac at Williamsport; also, that the
United States force at Romney had fallen back. A courier from Richmond brought a
dispatch authorizing me to evacuate Harper's Ferry at my discretion. The Army
was ordered to gain the Martinsburg turnpike by a flank movement to Bunker Hill,
in order to place itself between Winchester and the expected advance of
Patterson. On hearing of this, the enemy recrossed the river precipitately.
Resuming my first direction and plan, I proceeded to Winchester. There the Army
was in position to oppose either McClellan from the west or Patterson from the
northeast, and to form a junction with General Beauregard when necessary. Lieut.
Col. George H. Steuart, with his Maryland battalion, was sent to Harper's Ferry
to bring off some public property said to have been left. As McClellan was
moving southwest-ward from Grafton Colonel Hill's command was withdrawn from
Romney. The defense of that region of country was intrusted to Colonel
McDonald's regiment of cavalry.
Intelligence from Maryland indicating another movement by
Patterson, Colonel Jackson, with his brigade, was sent to the neighborhood of
Martinsburg to support Colonel Stuart. The latter officer had been placed in
observation on the line of the Potomac with his cavalry, his increasing
vigilance and activity relied on to repress small incursions of the enemy, to
give intelligence of invasion by them, and to watch, harass, and circumscribe
their every movement. Colonel Jackson was instructed to destroy such of the
rolling stock of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad as could not be brought off,
and to have so much of it as could be made available to our service brought to
Winchester.
Major Whiting was ordered to plan defensive works, and to
have some heavy guns and navy carriages mounted. About twenty-five hundred
militia, under Brigadier-General Carson, were called out from Frederick and the
neighboring counties to man them.
On the 2d of July General Patterson again crossed the
Potomac. Colonel Jackson, pursuant to instructions, fell back before him. In
retiring he gave him a severe lesson in the affair at Falling Waters. With a
battalion of the Fifth Virginia Regiment (Harper's) and Pendleton's battery of
field artillery he engaged the enemy's advance. Skillfully taking a position
where the smallness of his force was concealed, he engaged them for a
considerable time, inflicted a heavy loss, and retired when about to be
outflanked, scarcely losing a man, but bringing off forty-five prisoners.
Upon this intelligence the Army, strengthened by the arrival of General Bee and
Colonel Elzey and the Ninth Georgia Regiment, was ordered forward to the support
of Jackson. It met him at Darkesville, six miles from Martinsburg, where it took
up a position for action, as General Patterson, it was supposed, was closely
following Colonel Jackson. We waited for him in this position four days, hoping
to be attacked by an adversary at least double our numbers, but unwilling to
attack him in a town so defensible as Martinsburg, with its solid buildings and
inclosures of masonry. Convinced at length that he would not approach us I
returned to Winchester, much to the disappointment of our troops, who were eager
for battle with the invaders. Colonel Stuart, with his cavalry as usual,
remained near the enemy.
Before the 15th of July the enemy's force, according to the
best intelligence to be obtained, amounted to about thirty-two thousand. Ours
had been increased by eight Southern regiments. On the 15th of July Colonel
Stuart reported the advance of General Patterson from Martinsburg. He halted,
however, at Bunker Hill, nine miles from Winchester, where he remained on the
16th. On the 17th he moved to his left to Smithfield. This created the
impression that he intended to attack us on the south, or was merely holding us
in check while General Beauregard should be attacked at Manassas by General
Scott. About I o'clock on the morning of July 18 I received from the Government
a telegraphic dispatch informing me that the Northern Army was advancing upon
Manassas, then held by General Beauregard, and directing me, if practicable, to
go to that officer's assistance, after sending my sick to Culpeper Court-House.
In the exercise of the discretion conferred by the terms of the order, I at once
determined to march to join General Beauregard. The best service which the Army
of the Shenandoah could render was to prevent the defeat of that of the Potomac.
To be able to do this it was necessary, in the first instance, to defeat General
Patterson or to elude him. The latter course was the most speedy and certain,
and was therefore adopted. Our sick, nearly seventeen hundred in number, were
provided for in Winchester. For the defense of that place the militia of
Generals Carson and Meem seemed ample, for I thought it certain that General
Patterson would follow my movement as soon as he discovered it. Evading him by
the dispositions made of the advance-guard, under Colonel Stuart, the Army moved
through Ashby's Gap to Piedmont, a station of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Hence
the infantry were to be transported by the railway, while the cavalry and
artillery were ordered to continue their march.
I reached Manassas about noon on the 20th, preceded by the
Seventh and Eighth Georgia Regiments and by Jackson's brigade, consisting of the
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-seventh, and Thirty-third Virginia Regiments. I
was accompanied by General Bee, with the Fourth Alabama, the Second, and two
companies of the Eleventh Mississippi. The president of the railroad company had
assured me that the remaining troops should arrive during the day. I found
General Beauregard's position too extensive, and the ground too densely wooded
and intricate, to be learned in the brief time at my disposal, and therefore
determined to rely upon his knowledge of it and of the enemy's positions. This I
did readily from full confidence in his capacity.
His troops were divided into eight brigades, occupying the
defensive line of Bull Run. Brigadier-General Ewell's was posted at the Union
Mills Ford; Brig. Gen. D. R. Jones' at McLean's Ford; Brigadier-General
Longstreet's at Blackburn's Ford; Brigadier-General Bonham's at Mitchell's Ford;
Colonel Cocke's at Ball's Ford, some three miles above; and Colonel Evans, with
a regiment and battalion, formed the extreme left at the stone bridge. The
brigades of Brigadier-General Holmes and Colonel Early were in reserve in rear
of the right. I regarded the arrival of the remainder of the Army of the
Shenandoah during the night as certain, and Patterson's junction with the Grand
Army on the 22d as probable.
During the evening it was determined, instead of remaining in the defensive
positions then occupied, to assume the offensive and attack the enemy before
such a junction. General Beauregard proposed c plan of battle, which I approved
without hesitation. He drew up the necessary order during the night, which was
approved formally by me at 4.30 o'clock on the morning of the 21st. The early
movements of the enemy on that morning and the non-arrival of the expected
troops prevented its execution. General Beauregard afterwards proposed a
modification of the abandoned plan, to attack with our right while the left
stood on the defensive. Tills, too, became impracticable, and a battle ensued
different in place and circumstances from any previous plan on our side.
Soon after sunrise on the morning of the 21st a light
cannonade was opened upon Colonel Evans' position. A similar demonstration was
made against the center soon after, and strong forces were observed in front of
it and of the right. About 8 o'clock General Beauregard and I placed ourselves
on a commanding hill in rear of General Bonham's left. Near 9 o'clock the signal
officer, Captain Alexander, reported that a large body of troops was crossing
the valley of Bull Run some two miles above the bridge. General Bee, who had
been placed near Colonel Cocke's position Colonel Hampton, with his Legion, and
Colonel Jackson, from a point near General Bonham's left, were ordered to hasten
to the left flank. The signal officer soon called our attention to a heavy cloud
of dust to the northwest and about ten miles off, such as the march of an army
would raise. This excited apprehensions of General Patterson's approach.
The enemy, under cover of a strong demonstration on our
right, made a long detour through the woods on his right, crossed Bull Run two
miles above our left, and threw himself upon the flank and rear of our position.
This movement was fortunately discovered by us in time to check its progress,
and ultimately to form a new line of battle nearly at right angles with the
defensive line of Bull Run.
On discovering that the enemy had crossed the stream above
him, Colonel Evans moved to his left with eleven companies and two field-pieces
to oppose his advance, and disposed his little force under cover of the wood
near the intersection of the Warrenton turnpike and the Sudley road. Here he was
attacked by the enemy in immensely superior numbers, against which he maintained
himself with skill and unshrinking courage. General Bee moving towards the
enemy, guided by the firing, had with a soldier's eye selected the position near
the Henry house, and formed his troops upon it. They were the Seventh and Eighth
Georgia, Fourth Alabama, Second Mississippi, and two companies of the Eleventh
Mississippi, with Imboden's battery. Being compelled, however, to sustain
Colonel Evans, he crossed the valley and formed on the right and somewhat in
advance of his position. Here the joint force, little exceeding five regiments,
with six field pieces, held the ground against about fifteen thousand United
States troops for an hour, until, finding themselves outflanked by the
continually arriving troops of the enemy, they fell back to General Bee's first
position, upon the line of which Jackson, just arriving, formed his brigade and
Stanard's battery. Colonel Hampton, who had by this time advanced with his
Legion as far as the turnpike, rendered efficient service in maintaining the
orderly character of the retreat from that point; and here fell the gallant
Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, his second in command.
In the mean time I waited with General Beauregard near the
center the full development of the enemy's designs. About 11 o'clock the
violence of the firing on the left indicated a battle, and the march of a large
body of troops from the enemy's center towards the conflict was shown by clouds
of dust. I was thus convinced that his great effort was to be made with his
right. I stated that conviction to General Beauregard, and the absolute
necessity of immediately strengthening our left as much as possible. Orders were
accordingly at once sent to General Holmes and Colonel Early to move with all
speed to the sound of the firing, and to General Bonham to send up two of his
regiments and a battery. General Beauregard and I then hurried at a rapid gallop
to the scene of action, about four miles off. On the way I directed my chief of
artillery, Colonel Pendleton, to follow with his own and Alburtis' batteries.
We came not a moment too soon. The long contest against
fivefold odds and heavy losses, especially of field officers, had greatly
discouraged the troops of General Bee and Colonel Evans. Our presence with them
under fire and some example had the happiest effect on the spirit of the troops.
Order was soon restored and the battle re-established, to which the firmness of
Jackson's brigade greatly contributed. Then, in a brief and rapid conference,
General Beauregard was assigned to the command of the left, which, as the
younger officer, he claimed, while I returned to that of the whole field. The
aspect of affairs was critical, but I had full confidence in the skill and
indomitable courage of General Beauregard, the high soldierly qualities of
Generals Bee and Jackson and Colonel Evans, and the devoted patriotism of their
troops.
Orders were first dispatched to hasten the march of General
Holmes', Colonel Early's, and General. Bonham's regiments. General Ewell was
also directed to follow with all speed. Many of the broken troops, fragments of
companies, and individual stragglers were reformed and brought into action with
the aid of my staff and a portion of General Beauregard's. Colonel (late
Governor) Smith with his battalion and Colonel Hunton with his regiment were
ordered up to re-enforce the right. I have since learned that General Beauregard
had previously ordered them into the battle. They belonged to his corps. Colonel
Smith's cheerful courage had a fine influence, not only upon the spirit of his
own men, but upon the stragglers of the troops engaged. The largest body of
these, equal about four companies, having no competent field officer, I placed
under the command of one of my staff, Col. F. J. Thomas, who fell while
gallantly leading it against the enemy. These re-enforcements were all sent to
the right to re-establish more perfectly that part of our line. Having attended
to these pressing duties at the immediate scene of conflict, my eye was next
directed to Colonel Cocke's brigade, the nearest at hand. Hastening to his
position, I desired him to lead his troops into action. He informed me, however,
that a large body of the enemy's troops beyond the stream and below the bridge
threatened us from that quarter. He was therefore left in his position.
My headquarters were now established near the Lewis house.
From this commanding elevation my view embraced the position of the enemy beyond
the stream and the approaches to the stone bridge, a point of especial
importance. I could also see the advances of our troops far down the valley in
the direction of Manassas, and observe the progress of the action and the
maneuvers of the enemy.
We had now sixteen guns and two hundred and sixty cavalry and
a little above nine regiments of the Army of the Shenandoah and six guns, and
less than the strength of three regiments of that of the Potomac, engaged with
about thirty-five thousand United States troops, among whom were full three
thousand of the old Regular Army. Yet this admirable artillery and brave
infantry and cavalry lost no foot of ground. For nearly three hours they
maintained their position, repelling five successive assaults by the heavy
masses of the enemy, whose numbers enabled him continually to bring up fresh
troops as their preceding columns were driven back. Colonel Stuart contributed
to one of these repulses by a well-timed and vigorous charge on the enemy's
right flank with two companies of his cavalry.
The efficiency of our infantry and cavalry might have been
expected from a patriotic people accustomed like ours to the management of arms
and horses, but that of the artillery was little less than wonderful. They were
opposed to batteries far superior in the number, range, and equipment of their
guns, with educated officers and thoroughly instructed soldiers: We had but one
educated artillerist, Colonel Pendleton, that model of a Christian soldier, yet
they exhibited as much superiority to the enemy in skill as in courage. Their
fire was superior both in rapidity and precision.
About 2 o'clock an officer of General Beauregard's adjutant-general's office
galloped from Manassas to report to me that a United States army had reached the
line of Manassas Gap Railroad, was marching towards us, and then but three or
four miles from our left flank. The expected re-enforcements appeared soon
after. Colonel Cocke was then desired to lead his brigade into action to support
the right of the troops engaged, which he did with alacrity and effect. Within a
half hour the two regiments of General Bonham's brigade (Cash's and Kershaw's)
came up, and were directed against the enemy's right, which he seemed to be
strengthening. Fisher's North Carolina regiment was soon after sent in the same
direction. About 3 o'clock, while the enemy seemed to be striving to outflank
and drive back our left, and thus separate us from Manassas, General E. K. Smith
arrived with three regiments of Elzey's brigade. He was instructed to attack the
right flank of the enemy, now exposed to us. Before the movement was completed
he fell, severely wounded. Colonel Elzey, at once taking command, executed it
with great promptitude and vigor. General Beauregard rapidly seized the
opportunity thus afforded him, and threw forward his whole line. The enemy was
driven back from the long-contested hill, and victory was no longer doubtful.
He made yet another attempt to retrieve the day. He again
extended his right with a still wider sweep to turn our left. Just as he
reformed to renew the battle Colonel Early's three regiments came upon the
field. The enemy's new formation exposed his right flank more even than the
previous one. Colonel Early was therefore ordered to throw himself directly upon
it, supported by Colonel Stuart's Cavalry and Beck-ham's battery. He executed
this attack bravely and well, while a simultaneous charge was made by General
Beauregard in front. The enemy was broken by this combined attack. He lost all
the artillery which he had advanced to the scene of the conflict. He had no more
fresh troops to rally on, and a general rout ensued.
Instructions were instantly sent to General Bonham to march
by the quickest route to the turnpike to intercept the fugitives, and to General
Longstreet to follow as closely as possible upon the right. Their progress was
checked by the enemy's reserve and by night at Centreville. Schenck's brigade
made a slight demonstration towards Lewis' Ford, which was quickly checked by
Holmes' brigade, which had just arrived from the right. His artillery, under
Captain Walker, was used with great skill. Colonel Stuart pressed the pursuit on
the enemy's principal line of retreat, the Sudley road. Four companies of
cavalry, under Colonel Radford and Lieutenant-Colonel Munford, which I had held
in reserve, were ordered to cross the stream at Ball's Ford to reach the
turnpike, the line of retreat of the enemy's left. Our cavalry found the roads
encumbered with dead and wounded (many of whom seemed to have been thrown from
wagons), arms, accouterments, and clothing. A report came to me from the right
that a strong body of U.S. troops was advancing upon Manassas. General Holmes,
who had just reached the field, and General Ewell, on his way to it, were
ordered to meet this unexpected attack. They found no foe, however.
Our victory was as complete as one gained by infantry and
artillery can be. An adequate force of cavalry would have made it decisive. It
is due, under Almighty God, to the skill and resolution of General Beauregard,
the admirable conduct of Generals Bee, E. K. Smith, and Jackson, and of Colonels
(commanding brigades) Evans, Cocke, Early, and Elzey, and the courage and
Unyielding firmness of our patriotic volunteers. The admirable character of our
troops is incontestably proved by the result of this battle, especially when it
is remembered that little more than six thousand men of the Army of the
Shenandoah with sixteen guns, and less than two thousand of that of the Potomac
with six guns, for full five hours successfully resisted thirty-five thousand
U.S. troops with a powerful artillery and a superior force of regular cavalry.
Our threes engaged, gradually increasing during the remainder of the contest,
amounted to but -- men at the close of the battle. The brunt of this hard-fought
engagement fell upon the troops who held their ground so long with such heroic
resolution. The unfading honor which they won was dearly bought with the blood
of many of our best and bravest. Their loss was far heavier in proportion than
that of the troops coming later into action.
Every regiment and battery engaged performed its part well. The commanders of
brigades have been already mentioned. I refer you to General Beauregard's report
for the names of the officers of the Army of the Potomac who distinguished
themselves most. I cannot enumerate all of the Army of the Shenandoah who,
deserve distinction, and will confine myself to those of high rank: Colonels
Bartow and Fisher (killed); Jones (mortally wounded); Harper, J. F. Preston,
Cummings, Falkner, Gartrell, and Vaughn; J. E. B. Stuart, of the cavalry, and
Pendleton, of the artillery; Lieutenant-Colonels Echols, Lightfoot, Lackland, G.
H. Steuart, and Gardner. The last-named gallant officer was severely wounded.
The loss of the Army of the Potomac was 108 killed, 510 wounded, and 12 missing.
That of the Army of the Shenandoah was 270 killed, 979 wounded, and 18 missing.
Total killed, 378; wounded, 1,489; missing, 30. That of the enemy could not be
ascertained. It must have been four or five thousand. Twenty-eight pieces of
artillery, about five thousand muskets, and nearly five hundred thousand
cartridges, a garrison flag, and ten colors were captured on the field or in the
pursuit. Besides these we captured sixty-four artillery horses, with their
harness, twenty-six wagons, and much camp equipage, clothing, and other property
abandoned in their flight.
The officers of my staff deserve high commendation for their
efficient and gallant services during the day and the campaign, and I beg leave
to call the attention of the Government to their merits. Maj. W. H. C. Whiting,
chief engineer, was invaluable to me for his signal ability in his profession
and for his indefatigable activity before and in the battle. Major McLean, chief
quartermaster, and Major Kearsley, chief commissary, conducted their respective
departments with skill and energy. Major Rhett, assistant adjutant-general, who
joined me only the day before, was of great service. I left him at Manassas, and
to his experience and energy I intrusted the care of ordering my troops to the
field of battle as they should arrive, and forwarding ammunition for the
artillery during the action. Capts. C. M. Fauntleroy, C. S. Navy, T. L. Preston,
assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. J. B. Washington, aide-de-camp, conveyed
my orders bravely and well on this their first field, as did several gallant
gentlemen who volunteered their services--Colonel Cole, of Florida; Major Dens,
of Alabama; Colonel Duncan, of Kentucky. Lieut. Beverly Randolph, C. S. Army,
aided Col. F. J. Thomas in the command of the body of troops he led into action
and fought with gallantry. With these was my gallant friend Capt. Barlow Mason,
who was mortally wounded. I have already mentioned the brave death of my
ordnance officer, Col. F. J. Thomas. I was much indebted also to Cols. J. S.
Preston, Manning, Miles, and Chisolm, and Captain Stevens, of the Engineer
Corps, members of General Beauregard's staff, who kindly proffered their
services and rendered efficient and valuable aid at different times during the
day. Col. G. W. Lay, of General Bonham's staff, delivered the instructions to
the troops sent in pursuit and to intercept the enemy, with much intelligence
and courage.
It will be remarked that the three brigadier-generals of the
Army of the Shenandoah were all wounded. I have already mentioned the wound of
General Smith. General Jackson, though painfully wounded early in the day,
commanded his brigade until the close of the action. General Bee, after great
exposure at the commencement of the engagement, was mortally wounded just as our
re-enforcements were coming up.
The apparent firmness of the U.S. troops at Centreville, who had not been
engaged, which checked our pursuit; the strong forces occupying the works near
Georgetown, Arlington, and Alexandria; the certainty, too, that General
Patterson, if needed, would reach Washington with his army of thirty thousand
men sooner than we could, and the condition and inadequate means of the Army in
ammunition, provisions, and transportation prevented any serious thoughts of
advancing against the capital. It is certain that the fresh troops within the
works were in number quite sufficient for their defense. If not, General
Patterson's army would certainly re-enforce them soon enough.
This report will be presented to you by my aide-de-camp,
Lieut. J. B. Washington, by whom, and by General Beauregard's aide, Lieutenant
Ferguson, the captured colors are transmitted to the War Department.
Most respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. E. JOHNSTON, General
[Indorsement.]
The telegram referred to by General Johnston in this report as received by him
"about I o'clock on the morning of the 18th July" is inaccurately reported. The
following is a copy:
RICHMOND, July 17, 1861
General J.. E. JOHNSTON, Winchester, Va.:
General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow a junction
of all your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the movement,
sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper Court-House either by railroad or by
Warrenton. In all the arrangements exercise your discretion.
S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General
The word "after" is not found in the dispatch before the words "sending your
sick," as is stated in the report; so that the argument based on it requires no
comment. The order to move "if practicable" had reference to General Johnston's
letters of 12th and 15th July, representing the relative strength and positions
of the enemy under Patterson and of his own forces to be such as to make it
doubtful whether General Johnston had the power to effect the movement.
JEFFERSON DAVIS
-----
HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
Centreville, February 3, 1862
General S. COOPER ADJUTANT
Inspector General
SIR: My attention has been called to the fact that in the enumeration of the
officers who distinguished themselves in the battle of Manassas the name of Col.
S. B. Gibbons, commanding the Tenth Virginia Regiment, was omitted. This
omission was due to unaccountable carelessness, and is a matter of regret and
mortification to me. I beg that it may be corrected in my report on file in your
office, and the correction published. Colonel Gibbons and his gallant regiment
played an important part at a critical time, and injustice to them, even
accidentally, is unpardonable. Colonel Elzey, to whose brigade Colonel Gibbons
belongs, made honorable mention of him in his report.
Most respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. E. JOHNSTON,
General
Text Source - The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
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